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CASE COMMENT
treated under the act? The similarities between options and
convertible securities would seem to justify identical treatment?8
The use of two separate short-swing periods maximizes recover-
able profits while remaining within the six-months limitation of
the act. If, as in Babbitt, the option becomes exercisable, is exer-
cised, and the common received is sold within a six-month period,
profits recovered are the same under either standard. When the
period between the date the option is first exercisable and the
date of exercise exceeds six months and the underlying securities
are then sold within six months of the exercise, the proposed
standard would limit recovery to the increase in the value of the
securities between exercise and sale. But if the option is exercised
within six months from the time it first becomes exercisable and
the stock is held for more than six months before sale, recovery
of the increase in value of the option from the exercisable to the
exercise date would be permitted under the proposed standard.
Constitutional Law: Right To Travel Abroad
Protected by First and Fifth Amendments
Appellants, top-ranking leaders of the Communist Party of
the United States,' had their passports revoked pursuant to
Section 6 of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950? Sec-
tion 6 made it a felony for members of communist organizations,
calls, the proposal should be applicable to the option transactions. See note
24 supra.
27, See notes 9 & 12 supra and accompanying text.
28. The value of the underlying common stock may determine the value
of either options or convertible securities. Exercise or conversion may be
accomplished at the holder's discretion. See Heli-Coil Corp. v. Webster, 222
F. Supp. 831 (D.NJ. 1963), in which a corporate director who converted
debentures into common stock and later sold the stock was held liable for
profits both on the purchase and sale of the stock and on the receipt and
conversion of the debentures. Cf. Rubin & Feldman, supra note 2, at 492. See
also Meeker & Cooney, supra note 16, at 965. The fact that the option may
be nontransferable is not sufficient reason to distinguish the two. See note 24
supra.
1. Appellant Aptheker is editor of Political Affairs, the theoretical organ
of the party in this country and appellant Flynn is chairman of the party.
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964).
2. Section 6 reads:
(a) When a Communist organization as defined in paragraph (5)
of section 3 [infra note 14] of this title is registered, or there is in effect
a final order of the Board requiring such organization to register, it
shall be unlawful for any member of such organization, with knowledge
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ordered to register under the act,' to apply for, renew, or use
passports. Appellants sought an order directing the Secretary of
State to reissue them valid passports. The district court refused,
holding section 6 valid.' The Supreme Court reversed,' holding
section 6 unconstitutional on its face because it unduly restricted
the right to travel. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500
(1964).
Between 1952 and 1958 the almost absolute discretionary
power, formerly exercised by the Secretary of State in issuing
passports," was curtailed by a series of lower court decisions
which held: a passport could not be revoked without notice and
hearing nor could renewal be denied without a hearing;7 an
applicant was entitled to a quasi-judicial hearing in which the
Secretary must confront him with adverse evidence;8 and the
or notice that such organization is so registered or that such order has
become final -
(1) to make application for a passport, or the renewal of a passport,
to be issued or renewed by or under the authority of the United States;
or
(2) to use or attempt to use any such passport.
(b) When an organization is registered, or there is in effect a final
order of the Board requiring an organization to register, as a
Communist-action organization, it shall be unlawful for any officer or
employee of the United States to issue a passport to, or renew the
passport of, any individual knowing or having reason to believe that
such individual is a member of such organization.
64 Stat. 993 (1950), as amended, 50 U.S.C. § 785 (1958).
3. See 64 Stat. 1002 (1950), 50 U.S.C. § 794 (1958). Section 6 became
applicable to Aptheker and Flynn when the Communist Party of the United
States was ordered to register as a communist organization under the act
and that order was upheld by the Supreme Court. Communist Party of the
United States v. Subversive Activities Control Ed., 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
4. 219 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1963), 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 709.
5. Mr. Justice Goldberg wrote the opinion of the Court; Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, Justices Brennan and Stewart concurred. Justices Black and Douglas
wrote separate concurring opinions. Justices Clark, Harlan and White
dissented.
6. Since 1856 the Secretary of State has had authority to issue passports.
Act of August 18, 1856, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 60. They were not a prerequi-
site to travel outside the Western Hemisphere other than in times of war
until after World War II. See generally SrPcIAi, Comma. To STUDY PASSPORT
PROCEDURES OF THE Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT:
FREEDOM To TRAvEL (1958); Boudin, The Constitutional Right To Travel, 56
CoLxJm. L. REv. 47 (1956); Gould, The Right To Travel and National Se-
curity, 1961 WASH. U.L.Q. 334; Parker, The Right To Go Abroad* To Have
and To Hold a Passport, 40 VA. L. REV. 853 (1954); Pollitt & Rauh, Restric-
tions on the Right To Travel, 13 W. REs. L. REV. 128 (1961).
7. Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952).
8. Nathan v. Dulles, 129 F. Supp. 951 (D.D.C. 1955).
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power of the Secretary to deny passports could not be exercised
arbitrarily.' In 1958, in Kent 'v. Dulles,' the Supreme Court held
that a regulation restricting travel exceeded the Secretary's dis-
cretionary power as authorized by Congress and noted that "the
right to travel is a part of the 'liberty' of which the citizen can-
not be deprived without due process of law under the Fifth
Amendment.""
Aptheker is the first case in which the Court has held that a
statute restricting the right to travel abroad violated a citizen's
constitutional rights. The majority recognized that Congress,
for purposes of national security, can constitutionally impose
some restrictions on an individual's liberty, but held that section
6 provided insufficient criteria, in light of due process require-
ments, for determining its application?1 The law applied whether
or not an individual actually knew that a group of which he was
a member had been ordered to register; 3 it did not consider either
the degree of the individual's activity within the group or his
purpose of membership;' 4 and no consideration was given to the
purpose or place of travel.'
9. Schachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
10. 357 U.S. 116.
11. Id. at 125.
19. 878 U.S. at 514.
13. Section 13k of the Subversive Activities Control Act, 64 Stat. 1001
(1950), S0 U.S.C. § 792(k) (1958), states:
When any order of the Board requiring registration of a Communist
organization becomes final under the provisions of section 14(b) of this
title, the Board shall publish in the Federal Register the fact that
such order has become final, and publication thereof shall constitute
notice to all members of such organization that such order has become
final.
Therefore, actual knowledge of the order to register is not necessary to con-
vict a member of a registered group for applying for a passport.
14. Nor is § 6 limited to Communist Party members. Section 3(5), as
amended, 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 782(5) (1958), provides: "for the
purposes of this subehapter . . . the term 'Communist organization' means
any Communist-action organization, Communist-front organization, or
Communist-infiltrated organization." These organizations are defined in detail:
The term "Communist-infiltrated organization" means any organiza-
tion . . . which (A) is substantially directed, dominated, or controlled
by an individual or individuals who are, or who within three years
have been actively engaged in, giving aid or support to a Communist-
action organization, a Communist foreign government, or the world
Communist movement . . . and (B) is serving, or within three years
has served, as a means for (i) the giving of aid or support to any such
organization, government, or movement . . .
Section 3(4A), as amended, 68 Stat. 777 (1954), 50 U.S.C. § 782(4A) (1958).
15. 378 U.S. at 512. Under § 6 it is a crime "for a notified member of a
registered organization to apply for a passport to travel abroad to visit a
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The dissent contended that section 6 could constitutionally
be applied to appellants and should not be judged on its face." An
act of Congress merits a strong presumption of validity and
should not be overruled on the basis of hypothetical cases.'8 Nor
should constitutional questions be anticipated. 9 But these max-
ims of judicial restraint have given way to the preferred place
accorded first amendment rights.2 o If the legislation has an in-
hibitory effect on free expression, the statute itself must be
judged.?' The "on its face" approach has been used when a re-
stricted activity is considered essential to free expression. Such
activities include passing out handbillS 22 and the use of public
streets as a speaking platform?3 Neither of these activities is
mentioned in the first amendment, but the Court has given them
the same constitutional treatment as speech itself.
The right of expression is further protected by the prior re-
straint doctrine, 4 which forbids the prohibition of normally inno-
cent activities in advance. Governmental sanctions are limited
to punishment based upon a showing of illegal conduct resulting
from those activities?5 The doctrine is applied in the free expres-
sion context because of the undesirable consequences of prohibit-
ing expression before its content can be judged. A prior restraint
system usually requires a simple standard so that it will be easy
sick relative, . . . or for any other wholly innocent purpose." Id. at 511. The
text of § 6, quoted in note 2 supra, leaves no doubt as to its application to
this situation.
16. 378 U.S. at 523-25. The dissent pointed out that both Aptheker and
Flynn had been witnesses on behalf of the party in the registration proceeding
which resulted in the party being ordered to register and argued that the
majority's objection as to knowledge and activity did not apply to those
appellants. Id. at 523-24.
,17. See, e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 U.S. 29,
32 (1963).
18. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960).
19. Id. at 21.
20. "[T]he usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by that
preferred place given . . . the First Amendment." Thomas v. Collins, 328
U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945).
21. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22 (1960); Thornhill v. Alabama, 810 U.S. 88, 96-98
(1940).
22. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).
23. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951).
24. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931); Emerson, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 648, 652-55 (1955).
25. Prior restraint normally refers to an official restriction imposed on
speech or other forms of expression in advance of actual utterance or publica-
tion. Id. at 648.
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to apply. But in achieving simplicity the standard also tends
to prohibit activities which would have innocent results.26 Fur-
thermore, prior restraints are usually administratively rather
than judicially enforced. Administrators may not be as con-
cerned with constitutional rights as the courts 7 and effective
judicial review may be so delayed that the opportunity for
expression is worthless by the time it is available.8
The major objection to the use of the prior restraint doctrine
as a legal standard is that it is concerned only with the form of
a restriction rather than its substance.29 If the form of expression
and the activity for which subsequent punishment is possible are
as closely related as speech and slander or writing and libel, for
example, this objection to the prior restraint doctrine may be
valid, since the possibility of punishment for slander or libel may
well prevent the expression just as effectively as a prior restraint.
Thus the expresser, who is unable to determine what is libelous
and fears a libel action, may choose not to express himself at
all. But in the travel situation it is much easier to distinguish
the innocent act of travel from some collateral act for which the
traveler may be subsequently punished. Any fear the traveler
may have of subsequent punishment will tend to deter him from
the collateral act rather than the travel itself. In any event, the
ramifications of subsequent punishment for a given activity
should not affect the desirability of applying the prior restraint
doctrine. They merely indicate that the prior restraint doctrine
alone may not adequately protect constitutional freedoms.
The prior restraint doctrine is subject to exceptions in the
expression arease and has never been applied to travel. But it
26. A system of prior restraint subjects all expression within the area
controlled to government scrutiny, not just the patently bad. It is easier for
the Government to refuse permission for some dubious expression when the
duty is on the individual to obtain permission than it is for the Government
to punish a person for expression which it must prove to be illegal. Id. at
656-60.
27. CEAFEE, FREE SPEEcH iN THE UNiTED STATEs 314 (1941).
28. Emerson, supra note 24, at 657.
29. CnAFEE, op. cit. supra note 27, at 10, 521; Comment, The Prior Re-
straint of Speech and Press-A Critique of the Doctrine, 15 ALA. L. REv.
456, 459-60 (1968); Note, Prior Restraint-A Test of Invalidity In Free
Speeck Cases, 49 CoLum. L. REV. 1001, 1008 (1949).
80. In Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), the
Court upheld Chicago's practice of requiring all motion pictures to be sub-
mitted for approval before being publicly shown. Conceding that the practice
amounted to a prior restraint, the Court limited its holding to moving
pictures.
1965] 761
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
seems well-suited for such application. Travel may be as essential
an ingredient of expression as the opportunity to use a public
speaking place or the right to pass out handbills. If travel to
collect information is forbidden, the first amendment right of
expression is curtailed. Travel abroad may furnish information,
not otherwise available, which is essential to a meaningful dis-
cussion of important issues of foreign policy. The right of ex-
pression is directly curtailed when a person can speak only in
those places to which he can travel without a passport. 2
The Court's discussion of the defects in section 6 may indicate
its unwillingness to apply the prior restraint doctrine to the right
to travel. If the statute were carefully redrawn to meet the
Court's objections, an effective prior restraint could still be im-
posed on the right to travel of one falling within the statute's
scope. But by focusing on the Court's concern over the "purpose
of travel," application of the prior restraint doctrine is not incon-
sistent with the reasoning in Aptheker. The "purpose of travel"
requirement could be read to mean that travel may not be re-
strained unless it has an illegal purpose. If the purpose of travel
is illegal, denial of a passport can be viewed as part of the sub-
sequent punishment for the crime of attempting or conspiring
to commit an illegal act. It is also possible that if the statute is
redrawn to suit the Court, in effect, denial of a passport will be
permitted only as punishment for the crime of actively partici-
pating in a conspiracy to overthrow the Government. Under
either possibility a defendant should be entitled to the protection
of criminal trial procedures when his "right to travel" is at stake.
The harmful prior restraint effects of a passport denial would
thus be avoided.
In a more recent film censorship case, the Court distinguished Times Film
and reversed a conviction for failure to submit a movie for censorship prior
to public showing. Freedman v. Maryland, 85 Sup. Ct. 734 (1965). The Court
held that the Maryland statute did not provide adequate procedural safe-
guards, id. at 789, but clearly stated that with such safeguards a prior sub-
mission requirement was not unconstitutional. Id. at 740.
81. See Boudin, supra note 6, at 50; Gould, supra note 6, at 343; Pollitt
& Rauh, supra note 6, at 143-46. See also Meiklejohn, The First Amendment
is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245, 255.
32. See Boudin, supra note 6, at 50.
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